Compare commits
1
Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|
|
|
782a2bf06a |
@@ -1,33 +0,0 @@
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import type { Permission } from "../permission"
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import type { Agent } from "./agent"
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/**
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* Build the `permission` ruleset for a subagent's session when it's spawned
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* via the task tool. Combines:
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*
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* 1. The parent **agent's** deny rules — Plan Mode and other agent-level
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* restrictions live on the agent ruleset, not on the session, so a
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* subagent that only inherited the parent SESSION's permission would
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* silently bypass them. (#26514)
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* 2. The parent **session's** deny rules and external_directory rules —
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* same forwarding the original code already did.
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* 3. Default `todowrite` and `task` denies if the subagent's own ruleset
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* doesn't already permit them.
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*/
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export function deriveSubagentSessionPermission(input: {
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parentSessionPermission: Permission.Ruleset
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parentAgent: Agent.Info | undefined
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subagent: Agent.Info
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}): Permission.Ruleset {
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const canTask = input.subagent.permission.some((rule) => rule.permission === "task")
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const canTodo = input.subagent.permission.some((rule) => rule.permission === "todowrite")
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const parentAgentDenies = input.parentAgent?.permission.filter((rule) => rule.action === "deny") ?? []
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return [
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...parentAgentDenies,
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...input.parentSessionPermission.filter(
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(rule) => rule.permission === "external_directory" || rule.action === "deny",
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),
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...(canTodo ? [] : [{ permission: "todowrite" as const, pattern: "*" as const, action: "deny" as const }]),
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...(canTask ? [] : [{ permission: "task" as const, pattern: "*" as const, action: "deny" as const }]),
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]
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}
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@@ -2,13 +2,10 @@ export * as ConfigParse from "./parse"
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import { type ParseError as JsoncParseError, parse as parseJsoncImpl, printParseErrorCode } from "jsonc-parser"
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import { Cause, Exit, Schema as EffectSchema, SchemaIssue } from "effect"
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import * as Log from "@opencode-ai/core/util/log"
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import z from "zod"
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import type { DeepMutable } from "@opencode-ai/core/schema"
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import { InvalidError, JsonError } from "./error"
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const log = Log.create({ service: "config.parse" })
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type ZodSchema<T> = z.ZodType<T>
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export function jsonc(text: string, filepath: string): unknown {
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@@ -53,70 +50,34 @@ export function effectSchema<S extends EffectSchema.Decoder<unknown, never>>(
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data: unknown,
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source: string,
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): DeepMutable<S["Type"]> {
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// The user's config lives on disk and may legitimately be stale, hand-edited,
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// or carry leftover keys from older versions. Crashing the whole load on a
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// single bad field would make opencode unstartable for those users (see Ben
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// Matthews / Discord, v1.14.45). Strip the malformed top-level fields and
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// keep going — log every drop so users can see what was ignored and fix it.
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const cleaned = stripUnknownTopLevelKeys(schema, data, source)
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return decodeWithFieldTolerance(schema, cleaned, source)
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}
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function stripUnknownTopLevelKeys(schema: EffectSchema.Top, data: unknown, source: string): unknown {
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if (typeof data !== "object" || data === null || Array.isArray(data)) return data
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const extra = topLevelExtraKeys(schema, data)
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if (extra.length === 0) return data
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log.warn("ignoring unrecognized config keys", { source, keys: extra })
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const obj = data as Record<string, unknown>
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return Object.fromEntries(Object.entries(obj).filter(([key]) => !extra.includes(key)))
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}
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if (extra.length) {
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throw new InvalidError({
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path: source,
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issues: [
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{
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code: "unrecognized_keys",
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keys: extra,
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path: [],
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message: `Unrecognized key${extra.length === 1 ? "" : "s"}: ${extra.join(", ")}`,
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} as z.core.$ZodIssue,
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],
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})
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}
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function decodeWithFieldTolerance<S extends EffectSchema.Decoder<unknown, never>>(
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schema: S,
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data: unknown,
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source: string,
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): DeepMutable<S["Type"]> {
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// Try a clean decode first. If it succeeds we're done — common path.
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const decoded = EffectSchema.decodeUnknownExit(schema)(data, { errors: "all", propertyOrder: "original" })
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if (Exit.isSuccess(decoded)) return decoded.value as DeepMutable<S["Type"]>
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const error = Cause.squash(decoded.cause)
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const issues = EffectSchema.isSchemaError(error)
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? (SchemaIssue.makeFormatterStandardSchemaV1()(error.issue).issues as z.core.$ZodIssue[])
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: ([{ code: "custom", message: String(error), path: [] }] as z.core.$ZodIssue[])
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// Identify malformed top-level fields. Anything with a non-empty path is a
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// field-scoped issue we can drop and retry. Issues with an empty path are
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// root-level (e.g. data is not an object at all) and can't be field-recovered.
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const badFields = collectTopLevelFieldNames(issues)
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if (badFields.size === 0 || typeof data !== "object" || data === null || Array.isArray(data)) {
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throw new InvalidError({ path: source, issues }, { cause: error })
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}
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log.warn("ignoring invalid config fields", {
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source,
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fields: [...badFields],
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summary: issues
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.filter((issue) => issue.path && issue.path.length > 0)
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.map((issue) => `${issue.path?.join(".")}: ${issue.message}`)
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.slice(0, 8),
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})
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const obj = data as Record<string, unknown>
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const cleaned = Object.fromEntries(Object.entries(obj).filter(([key]) => !badFields.has(key)))
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// Retry without the bad fields. If THIS fails, we're past field-tolerance —
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// fall back to the original strict error so the user sees the real cause.
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const retry = EffectSchema.decodeUnknownExit(schema)(cleaned, { errors: "all", propertyOrder: "original" })
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if (Exit.isSuccess(retry)) return retry.value as DeepMutable<S["Type"]>
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throw new InvalidError({ path: source, issues }, { cause: error })
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}
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function collectTopLevelFieldNames(issues: z.core.$ZodIssue[]): Set<string> {
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const names = new Set<string>()
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for (const issue of issues) {
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const head = issue.path?.[0]
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if (typeof head === "string") names.add(head)
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}
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return names
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throw new InvalidError(
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{
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path: source,
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issues: EffectSchema.isSchemaError(error)
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? (SchemaIssue.makeFormatterStandardSchemaV1()(error.issue).issues as z.core.$ZodIssue[])
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: ([{ code: "custom", message: String(error), path: [] }] as z.core.$ZodIssue[]),
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},
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{ cause: error },
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)
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}
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function topLevelExtraKeys(schema: EffectSchema.Top, data: unknown) {
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@@ -4,7 +4,6 @@ import { Session } from "@/session/session"
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import { SessionID, MessageID } from "../session/schema"
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import { MessageV2 } from "../session/message-v2"
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import { Agent } from "../agent/agent"
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import { deriveSubagentSessionPermission } from "../agent/subagent-permissions"
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import type { SessionPrompt } from "../session/prompt"
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import { Config } from "@/config/config"
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import { Effect, Exit, Schema } from "effect"
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@@ -59,25 +58,41 @@ export const TaskTool = Tool.define(
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return yield* Effect.fail(new Error(`Unknown agent type: ${params.subagent_type} is not a valid agent type`))
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}
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const canTask = next.permission.some((rule) => rule.permission === id)
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const canTodo = next.permission.some((rule) => rule.permission === "todowrite")
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const taskID = params.task_id
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const session = taskID
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? yield* sessions.get(SessionID.make(taskID)).pipe(Effect.catchCause(() => Effect.succeed(undefined)))
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: undefined
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const parent = yield* sessions.get(ctx.sessionID)
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const parentAgent = parent.agent
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? yield* agent.get(parent.agent).pipe(Effect.catchCause(() => Effect.succeed(undefined)))
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: undefined
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const nextSession =
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session ??
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(yield* sessions.create({
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parentID: ctx.sessionID,
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title: params.description + ` (@${next.name} subagent)`,
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permission: [
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...deriveSubagentSessionPermission({
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parentSessionPermission: parent.permission ?? [],
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parentAgent,
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subagent: next,
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}),
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...(parent.permission ?? []).filter(
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(rule) => rule.permission === "external_directory" || rule.action === "deny",
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),
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...(canTodo
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? []
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: [
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{
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permission: "todowrite" as const,
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pattern: "*" as const,
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action: "deny" as const,
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},
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]),
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...(canTask
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? []
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: [
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{
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permission: id,
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pattern: "*" as const,
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action: "deny" as const,
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},
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]),
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...(cfg.experimental?.primary_tools?.map((item) => ({
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pattern: "*",
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action: "allow" as const,
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@@ -129,8 +144,8 @@ export const TaskTool = Tool.define(
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},
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agent: next.name,
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tools: {
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...(next.permission.some((rule) => rule.permission === "todowrite") ? {} : { todowrite: false }),
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...(next.permission.some((rule) => rule.permission === id) ? {} : { task: false }),
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...(canTodo ? {} : { todowrite: false }),
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...(canTask ? {} : { task: false }),
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...Object.fromEntries((cfg.experimental?.primary_tools ?? []).map((item) => [item, false])),
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},
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parts,
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@@ -1,141 +0,0 @@
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/**
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* Reproducer for opencode issue #26514:
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*
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* In Plan Mode (the `plan` agent), the main agent's edit/write tools are
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* blocked by the plan agent's permission ruleset (`edit: { "*": "deny" }`).
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* However, when the plan agent spawns a subagent via the `task` tool, the
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* subagent retains full file modification capabilities — a security bypass.
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*
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* This test replicates the permission ruleset that would govern a
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* `general` subagent when launched from a `plan` parent session, mirroring
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* the logic in `src/tool/task.ts` (filtered parent permissions ++ runtime
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* subagent agent permissions, evaluated as in `session/prompt.ts`).
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*
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* The expected (secure) behavior is that the subagent inherits the plan
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* mode read-only restriction and `edit`/`write` resolve to `deny`. On
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* origin/dev this assertion fails because the parent **agent** permissions
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* are not propagated to the subagent — only the parent **session**
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* permissions are passed through, and Plan Mode's restrictions live on the
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* agent, not the session.
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*/
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import { test, expect, afterEach } from "bun:test"
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import { Effect } from "effect"
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import { disposeAllInstances, provideInstance, tmpdir } from "../fixture/fixture"
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import { WithInstance } from "../../src/project/with-instance"
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import { Agent } from "../../src/agent/agent"
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import { deriveSubagentSessionPermission } from "../../src/agent/subagent-permissions"
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import { Permission } from "../../src/permission"
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afterEach(async () => {
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await disposeAllInstances()
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})
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function load<A>(dir: string, fn: (svc: Agent.Interface) => Effect.Effect<A>) {
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return Effect.runPromise(provideInstance(dir)(Agent.Service.use(fn)).pipe(Effect.provide(Agent.defaultLayer)))
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}
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// `deriveSubagentSessionPermission` is imported from production. The test
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// exercises the actual helper that task.ts uses to build the subagent's
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// session permission, so any regression in that helper trips this test.
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test("[#26514] subagent spawned from plan mode inherits read-only restriction (edit denied)", async () => {
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await using tmp = await tmpdir()
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await WithInstance.provide({
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directory: tmp.path,
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fn: async () => {
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const planAgent = await load(tmp.path, (svc) => svc.get("plan"))
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const generalAgent = await load(tmp.path, (svc) => svc.get("general"))
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expect(planAgent).toBeDefined()
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expect(generalAgent).toBeDefined()
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// Sanity: the plan agent itself blocks edit. (Note: `write` and
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// `apply_patch` route through the `edit` permission at the runtime
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// tool layer — see Permission.disabled / EDIT_TOOLS.)
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expect(Permission.evaluate("edit", "/some/file.ts", planAgent!.permission).action).toBe("deny")
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// Simulate the plan-mode parent session: in real flow the plan
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// session's `permission` field is empty (Plan Mode lives on the agent
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// ruleset, not the session). So we pass [] through as the parent
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// session permission, exactly like the actual code path.
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const parentSessionPermission: Permission.Ruleset = []
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const subagentSessionPermission = deriveSubagentSessionPermission({
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parentSessionPermission,
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parentAgent: planAgent,
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subagent: generalAgent!,
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})
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// Mirror the runtime evaluation in session/prompt.ts (~line 410, 639):
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// ruleset: Permission.merge(agent.permission, session.permission ?? [])
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const effective = Permission.merge(generalAgent!.permission, subagentSessionPermission)
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expect(Permission.evaluate("edit", "/some/file.ts", effective).action).toBe("deny")
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expect(Permission.evaluate("edit", "/another/path/index.tsx", effective).action).toBe("deny")
|
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},
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||||
})
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})
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|
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test("[#26514] explore subagent launched from plan mode also stays read-only", async () => {
|
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// Sibling check: even though `explore` is intrinsically read-only, the
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// bug surface is the same. Including this case to document that the fix
|
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// should propagate the parent **agent** permissions, not just deny edit
|
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// when the subagent happens to already deny it.
|
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await using tmp = await tmpdir()
|
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await WithInstance.provide({
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directory: tmp.path,
|
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fn: async () => {
|
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const planAgent = await load(tmp.path, (svc) => svc.get("plan"))
|
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const explore = await load(tmp.path, (svc) => svc.get("explore"))
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expect(planAgent).toBeDefined()
|
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expect(explore).toBeDefined()
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|
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const parentSessionPermission: Permission.Ruleset = []
|
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const subagentSessionPermission = deriveSubagentSessionPermission({
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parentSessionPermission,
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parentAgent: planAgent,
|
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subagent: explore!,
|
||||
})
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const effective = Permission.merge(explore!.permission, subagentSessionPermission)
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|
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// Already deny — sanity check.
|
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expect(Permission.evaluate("edit", "/x.ts", effective).action).toBe("deny")
|
||||
},
|
||||
})
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
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test("[#26514] custom user subagent launched from plan mode bypasses Plan Mode read-only", async () => {
|
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// The most damaging case: a user-defined subagent with default
|
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// permissions (allow-by-default, like `general`). The subagent must NOT
|
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// be able to edit when the parent agent is `plan`.
|
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await using tmp = await tmpdir({
|
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config: {
|
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agent: {
|
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my_subagent: {
|
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description: "A user-defined subagent",
|
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mode: "subagent",
|
||||
},
|
||||
},
|
||||
},
|
||||
})
|
||||
await WithInstance.provide({
|
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directory: tmp.path,
|
||||
fn: async () => {
|
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const planAgent = await load(tmp.path, (svc) => svc.get("plan"))
|
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const my = await load(tmp.path, (svc) => svc.get("my_subagent"))
|
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expect(planAgent).toBeDefined()
|
||||
expect(my).toBeDefined()
|
||||
|
||||
const parentSessionPermission: Permission.Ruleset = []
|
||||
const subagentSessionPermission = deriveSubagentSessionPermission({
|
||||
parentSessionPermission,
|
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parentAgent: planAgent,
|
||||
subagent: my!,
|
||||
})
|
||||
const effective = Permission.merge(my!.permission, subagentSessionPermission)
|
||||
|
||||
// BUG: on origin/dev edit resolves to "allow" because the plan
|
||||
// agent's `edit: deny *` rule never reaches the subagent.
|
||||
expect(Permission.evaluate("edit", "/some/file.ts", effective).action).toBe("deny")
|
||||
},
|
||||
})
|
||||
})
|
||||
@@ -558,22 +558,20 @@ test("handles file inclusion with replacement tokens", async () => {
|
||||
})
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
test("config loader is tolerant: drops unknown fields, keeps the rest", async () => {
|
||||
test("validates config schema and throws on invalid fields", async () => {
|
||||
await using tmp = await tmpdir({
|
||||
init: async (dir) => {
|
||||
await writeConfig(dir, {
|
||||
$schema: "https://opencode.ai/config.json",
|
||||
username: "kept",
|
||||
invalid_field: "should be dropped, not crash the app",
|
||||
invalid_field: "should cause error",
|
||||
})
|
||||
},
|
||||
})
|
||||
await provideTestInstance({
|
||||
directory: tmp.path,
|
||||
fn: async () => {
|
||||
const config = await load()
|
||||
expect(config.username).toBe("kept")
|
||||
expect((config as Record<string, unknown>).invalid_field).toBeUndefined()
|
||||
// Strict schema should throw an error for invalid fields
|
||||
await expect(load()).rejects.toThrow()
|
||||
},
|
||||
})
|
||||
})
|
||||
@@ -1683,70 +1681,7 @@ test("permission config preserves user key order", async () => {
|
||||
})
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
// Discord bug report (Ben Matthews, v1.14.45): a malformed `skills:` field
|
||||
// (array instead of object) made the WHOLE config fail to load, the server
|
||||
// returned 500, and the desktop app couldn't start. Per Kit:
|
||||
// "for all of these things that we load from the user's computer, they
|
||||
// should be kind of tolerant. ... It shouldn't break opencode."
|
||||
// The contract: drop the malformed top-level field, log a warning, keep
|
||||
// the rest of the config so the app starts.
|
||||
test("config parser is tolerant: drops malformed top-level fields, keeps the rest", () => {
|
||||
const config = ConfigParse.effectSchema(
|
||||
Config.Info,
|
||||
{
|
||||
$schema: "https://opencode.ai/config.json",
|
||||
username: "ben",
|
||||
// Wrong shape — schema expects { paths?, urls? }, user has an array
|
||||
// (looks like the LOADED skills list got pasted into the config).
|
||||
skills: [
|
||||
{ name: "scss-layout-accessibility", path: ".opencode/skills/scss-layout-accessibility.md" },
|
||||
{ name: "testing", path: ".opencode/skills/testing.md" },
|
||||
],
|
||||
},
|
||||
"test",
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// Pre-fix this throws ConfigInvalidError and the user can't start opencode.
|
||||
// Post-fix the bad field is dropped and the rest of the config loads.
|
||||
expect(config.username).toBe("ben")
|
||||
expect(config.skills).toBeUndefined()
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
test("config parser is tolerant: drops unrecognized top-level keys instead of throwing", () => {
|
||||
const config = ConfigParse.effectSchema(
|
||||
Config.Info,
|
||||
{
|
||||
$schema: "https://opencode.ai/config.json",
|
||||
username: "ben",
|
||||
// Typo or stale key — pre-fix this threw `unrecognized_keys`.
|
||||
autoshrare: true,
|
||||
},
|
||||
"test",
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
expect(config.username).toBe("ben")
|
||||
expect((config as Record<string, unknown>).autoshrare).toBeUndefined()
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
test("config parser is tolerant: drops multiple bad fields in one pass", () => {
|
||||
const config = ConfigParse.effectSchema(
|
||||
Config.Info,
|
||||
{
|
||||
$schema: "https://opencode.ai/config.json",
|
||||
username: "ben",
|
||||
skills: ["wrong shape"],
|
||||
autoshare: 42, // wrong type — schema wants string literal | undefined
|
||||
not_a_real_key: "ignore me",
|
||||
},
|
||||
"test",
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
expect(config.username).toBe("ben")
|
||||
expect(config.skills).toBeUndefined()
|
||||
expect(config.autoshare).toBeUndefined()
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
test("Effect config parser preserves permission order while dropping unknown top-level keys", () => {
|
||||
test("Effect config parser preserves permission order while rejecting unknown top-level keys", () => {
|
||||
const config = ConfigParse.effectSchema(
|
||||
Config.Info,
|
||||
{
|
||||
@@ -1760,10 +1695,13 @@ test("Effect config parser preserves permission order while dropping unknown top
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
expect(Object.keys(config.permission!)).toEqual(["bash", "*", "edit"])
|
||||
// Tolerant parser: unknown keys are stripped (with a warning log) instead
|
||||
// of failing the entire config load.
|
||||
const stripped = ConfigParse.effectSchema(Config.Info, { invalid_field: true }, "test")
|
||||
expect((stripped as Record<string, unknown>).invalid_field).toBeUndefined()
|
||||
try {
|
||||
ConfigParse.effectSchema(Config.Info, { invalid_field: true }, "test")
|
||||
throw new Error("expected config parse to fail")
|
||||
} catch (err) {
|
||||
const error = err as { data?: { issues?: Array<{ code?: string; keys?: string[]; path?: string[] }> } }
|
||||
expect(error.data?.issues?.[0]).toMatchObject({ code: "unrecognized_keys", keys: ["invalid_field"], path: [] })
|
||||
}
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
// MCP config merging tests
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user